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PRESUMED DAMAGES FOR FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
Over the past decade, private damage actions against govern-
ment officials have assumed increasing importance as a mechanism
for the vindication of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics' opened the federal courts to damage
suits by individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated
by federal officials. Similar suits2 against state officials in federal
court, long allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 have enjoyed a burst
of popularity.4 The Supreme Court recently extended the reach
of section 1983 to suits directly against local governments,5 and
1403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court recognized a direct cause of action against
federal officials for a violation of the fourth amendment, rejecting the government's
argument that plaintiffs must sue under a state tort cause of action. A direct action
against federal officials has also been implied for other constitutional violations.
See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment); Paton v.
La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); Berlin Dem. Club v.
Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (sixth amendment); Patmore v. Carlson,
392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. II. 1975) (eighth amendment).
2A line of lower federal court decisions has expressly characterized the Bivens
action as the federal counterpart to § 1983. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
500 (1978). Thus, this Comment draws few substantive distinctions between § 1983
and Bivens actions. But see notes 51 & 104 infra.
3 The statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 1980). This section was enacted as § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
Original jurisdiction over § 1983 claims is vested in the lower federal courts by
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
4 See Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67
CALIF. L. Rzv. 1242 (1979); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers" Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447, 451-53 (1978).
5 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Further, the
proposed Civil Rights Improvements Act would significantly expand the potential
liability of municipalities by allowing, inter alia, in some circumstances, recovery
of damages against a city, even if an official acted contrary to city policy. See S.
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legislation that would add the United States itself to the list of
potential defendants has been proposed in recent sessions of Con-
gress. 6  For victims of official lawlessness and for society, however,
access to the appropriate defendant is of little use and slight value
unless success on the merits of the claim will ensure a damage
recovery that adequately compensates for the loss the governmental
body or official has inflicted and deters the governmental body or
official from future violations. Workable rules defining the
elements of compensable loss and the procedures for assigning that
loss a dollar value in a particular case are crucial in order to allow
the courts to promise vindication of constitutional rights to all
citizens.
The doctrine of presumed damages 7 has been suggested as a
means of bringing more consistency and equity to awards of dam-
ages for constitutional torts that do not cause substantial measurable
pecuniary loss." This Comment will explore the presumed damages
concept and its potential utility in the fourth amendment context.
After defining certain tort law damage concepts as background to
the ensuing discussion, part I will identify certain problems in the
assessment and review of constitutional tort damage awards and
compare alternative approaches to these problems with the solution
offered by the doctrine of presumed damages. Part II will then
focus specifically on the presumed damage doctrine in the area of
fourth amendment violations. In the recent case of Halperin v.
Kissinger,9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
fused to apply the doctrine of presumed damages in the context of
wiretapping concededly violative of the fourth amendment. 10 Al-
1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. Eec. 515, 994 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979);
Comment, The Collateral-Estoppel Effect to be Given State-Court Judgments in
Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1471, 1487 n.77 (1980).
6 See H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. Eec. H1107 (daily ed.
March 6, 1979); S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REG. S2919 (daily ed.
March 15, 1979). These proposed amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680 (1976)), would make the United States the
sole defendant in suits for torts committed by federal employees within the scope
of their employment.
7The doctrine of presumed damages provides that substantial injury may be
presumed to flow from certain tortious acts when they invade interests that are
not capable of precise physical or monetary measurement. See text following note
54 infra.
8 See Love, supra note 4, at 1282; Newman, supra note 4, at 465; Note,
Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus,
93 Hnv. L. Ray. 966 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
9 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2915 (1980) (No.
79-880).
10 Numerous other issues dealt with in Halperin, including interpretation and
application of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1980]
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though the Supreme Court, in Carey v. Piphus," rejected a pre-
sumption of substantial damage in the procedural due process area,
the Court recognized that different rules may be appropriate to
remedy different constitutional wrongs. 12 This Comment takes the
position that the Halperin court should have held that the plaintiffs
in that case were entitled to a presumption of substantial injury, in
light of important differences between fourth amendment and pro-
cedural due process rights.
I. PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING DAMAGES FOR DEPRIVATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The task of fashioning the federal law of constitutional tort
damages has been left largely to the lower federal courts, pursuant
to the Supreme Court's command to adapt the common law of
remedies to the needs of constitutional enforcement.' 3 Apart from
Carey v. Piphus, in which the holding was expressly limited to the
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as Title
III, and doctrines of official immunity, are outside the scope of this Comment.
11435 U.S. 247 (1978). In Piphus, two students alleged that they were sus-
pended from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due
process and sued school officials under § 1983 for violation of their fourteenth amend-
ment rights. The Court held that, in the absence of proof of actual injury, only
nominal damages should be awarded for the denial of procedural due process. See
notes 73-88 infra & accompanying text.
12 435 U.S. at 264-65.
IS In some cases, the Interests protected by a particular branch of the
common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a par-
ticular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to apply
the tort rules of damages directly to the § 1983 action. . . . In [other]
cases, the task will be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules
of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the de-
privation of a constitutional right.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
Piphus is, in reality, only the latest in a line of Supreme Court opinions issuing
this directive to the lower federal courts. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407-09 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (judges should adapt their experience with traditional private tort
actions to accord "meaningful compensation" for invasion of fourth amendment
rights); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231-32 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in a case in which denial of equal pro-
tection on the basis of race is the theory of recovery in a § 1983 action, "relief
should not depend on the vagaries of the general common law but should be gov-
erned by uniform and effective federal standards"); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969) (damages action for racial discrimination in
housing) ("[Bloth federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, whichever
better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes:'); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (§ 1983 action for damages from
unlawful search and seizure) ("[A] deprivation of a constitutional right is signifi-
cantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state
tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right."), overruled in part on other
grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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procedural due process area, the Court has given little guidance on
the rules applicable to specific constitutional violations. 14 The
following is'a brief summary of the common law damages concepts
that provide the basis for modem constitutional damages law.
A. Common Law Damages Framework
The law of torts differentiates among three classes of damages:
nominal, punitive, and compensatory.15
Nominal damages consist of a trifling sum 1 6 that serves only as
a symbolic declaration that the defendant has invaded a legally pro-
tected interest of the plaintiff.' 7 They are awarded in lieu of com-
pensatory damages in certain cases in which the plaintiff succeeds
on the merits of his claim but fails to establish his entitlement to a
substantial compensatory award.' 8
Punitive damages may be awarded only in addition to either
nominal or compensatory damages, and only when the defendant's
conduct has been egregious.' 9 Their purpose is to punish those
defendants who are not only "at fault" in the tort law sense, but
morally reprehensible in some high degree as well.20  In addition,
they are intended to serve as a deterrent to repetition of the objec-
tionable act.2 ' The American rule, unlike the English standard,
requires the jury to label separately the "punitive" portion of its
damage award.
22
Unlike nominal and punitive damages, compensatory awards
focus on the harm suffered by the plaintiff and attempt to "undo"
14 See note 13 supra. Lower courts have differed since Piphus on the issue
whether to apply Piphus's actual injury requirement or some other measure in cases
of constitutional violations. See Harvard Note, supra note 8, at 972-73, notes 146 &
147 infra & accompanying text.
'5 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF RmEDIEmS § 3.1 (1973); RESTATE-
1mmr (SEscoN) OF TORTS §§ 901-909 (1977); Love, supra note 4, at 1244-47.
16The standard amount of nominal damages is one dollar. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 15, at § 3.8. But see, e.g., United States ex rel. Motley v. Bundle, 340
F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (nominal damage award of $1000).
17 D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 3.8.
's Id. Trespass to land cases are an example; the plaintiff has a right to ex-
clusive possession of his land, and though the defendant's trespass causes no com-
pensable economic harm, the plaintiff is entitled to vindicate his right by the
recovery of nominal damages. Other actions in which nominal damages are recov-
erable include battery, assault, false imprisonment, defamation, and malicious
prosecution. See id.; Love, supra note 4, at 1246.
'9 D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 3.9. See Love, supra note 4, at 1279-81.
20 D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 3.9; Love, supra note 4, at 1278-81.
21 The amount of a punitive award is linked to the defendant's ability to pay.
D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 3.9. Apparently, the idea is to set the award at a
level that will "pinch" the defendant's pocketbook as well as his conscience.
22 C. McComuc, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAmAGES § 78, at 278-79
(1935).
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the effects of the tortious act.23 At the same time, by shifting the
economic burden of the tort from the plaintiff to the defendant,
compensatory damages serve a deterrent function.2 The types of
harm recognized as compensable include special damages (pecuniary
loss unique to the particular plaintiff, such as medical bills and lost
wages), general damages of a pecuniary sort (such as projected loss
of income due to impairment of earning capacity), and general
damages of a nonpecuniary, or "intangible," sort (such as mental
and physical pain and suffering). 25 The plaintiff bears the burden
of proving the fact, proximate causation, and amount of each of
these types of damages,26 except where his cause of action is based
on invasion of certain "dignitary" interests, 27 such as privacy 28 and
voting rights.29 It is in these cases that the doctrine of presumed
damages played a role at common law. That doctrine provides that
substantial injury may be presumed to flow from certain tortious
acts, even though the plaintiff has presented no proof of actual loss,
when the torts invade interests that are intangible, rather than
physical or economic.3 0 As Professor Dobbs explains, "the wrong
is said to be damage in and of itself." 31
B. Compensating for Deprivation of Intangible Constitutional
Rights: Alternatives to the Presumed Damages Concept
Many constitutionally protected rights are intangible in nature:
as highly as society values them, one cannot hope to "prove" their
value as one would prove the economic value of a tortiously de-
stroyed eye, breadwinner, or prize cow. Federal courts have dealt
23 D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 3.1.
24 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccmENTs cbs. 5 & 6 (1970);
R. Posure, AN EcoNOMIc ANALYsIs OF TBE LAw § 4.9 (1972); Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
25 See H. McGnmooa, DA MAES 16-20 (13th ed. 1972); Love, supra note 4,
at 1245 n.16.
2 6 D. DoBBs, supra note 15, at § 3.2. Obviously, the "amount" of pain and
suffering cannot be proved with mathematical precision, unlike the amount of a hos-
pital bill. Essentially, the valuation of intangible general damages must be left to
the jury. See H. McGEGo, supra note 25, at 19.
2 7 Professor Dobbs defines dignitary invasions as "injuries to the personality.
This means that, though economic or physical loss may be associated with the in-
jury, the primary or usual concern is not economic at all, but vindication of an
intangible right." D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 7.1, at 509.
2 8 See id.; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TonTs §652(H)(a) (1977).
29 See Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919) (right to vote "is so
valuable that damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it." Id.
66); D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 7.3. See also note 32 infra & accompanying
text; note 120 infra.




with this problem in voting rights cases, for example, by allowing
recovery of substantial damages without proof of actual loss. 32 The
logic of such a solution is impeccable. One could easily imagine a
situation in which an individual's constitutionally guaranteed right
to vote in a federal election is abridged by conduct of a government
official that is intentional and tortious but that fails to satisfy the
stringent "wanton or malicious" standard necessary for an award
of punitive damages.33 In all likelihood, such a plaintiff will be
unable to prove any actual damage consequent to the tortious act.
Yet it is a fundamental tenet of our democratic system that the
right to vote is valuable in and of itself.m A judicial refusal to
presume damages would restrict one deprived of this right to no,
or merely nominal, damages. Such an approach would both belittle
the right itself and ensure that suits to vindicate it would be the
exclusive preserve of the quixotic.
Although the right to recover substantial damages without
proof of actual loss has long been recognized by the federal courts
in voting rights cases,35 other constitutiontal deprivations, such as
those involved in first amendment, fourth amnedment, and racial
discrimination cases, have not been consistently recognized as com-
pensable in and of themselves. This result may occur in part be-
cause, in some cases, a presumption of substantial damages is not
crucial to a plaintiff's success, since actual, provable damage
frequently will also result from the violation of these particular
intangible constitutional rights.36 Thus, the ability to demonstrate
3 2 See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903); Wiley v. Sinlder, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th
Cir. 1919).
33 For discussions of the degree of culpability necessary to support punitive
awards in constitutional tort cases, see Fisher v. Vo]z, 496 F.2d 333, 346-48 (3d
Cir. 1974) (jury verdict for punitive damages against police officer for unlawful
warrantless search sustained as within the discretion of the trier of fact); Basista v.
Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965) (jury could properly award punitive dam-
ages under federal common law against police officer for assault, wrongful arrest,
denial of bail, and denial of counsel, despite lack of proof of actual damages);
Halperin v. Kissinger, 434 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D.C. 1977) (conduct of federal
officials who unconstitutionally wiretapped plaintiff's telephone not "wanton, reck-
less or malicious disregard of plaintiff's rights" justifying imposition of punitive
damages), rev'd in part and remanded, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 2915 (1980) (No. 79-880).
34 See note 29 supra.
35 See note 32 supra & accompanying text.
36 For example, first amendment suits brought by employees discharged for
exercising their free speech rights typically seek back pay as the most substantial
element of damages. See, e.g., Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882
(1st Cir. 1976) (back pay awarded for politically motivated discharge of public
19803
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and easily quantify lost wages, medical expenses, and the like has
provided sufficient incentive for many plaintiffs to bring suit to
enforce certain constitutional rights, even if the right itself is
ignored as a separate element of compensable damage due to
judicial refusal to presume injury.
In many cases, however, pecuniary losses are trivial or non-
existent, and the only substantial "actual" loss 87 the plaintiff can
hope to prove is mental pain and suffering. Consider, for example,
a couple subjected to racial discrimination in their search for
housing. The only substantial damage that they have suffered is
the affront to their constitutional right to be accorded equal treat-
ment in the housing market. Instead of following the approach of
federal courts in voting rights cases and recognizing violation of
this right as an element of damages compensable in and of itself,
some courts have taken the circuitous route by focusing on the
plaintiffs' wounded feelings and insisting that recovery can be had
only for "proven" emotional distress, humiliation, and the like.38
employee); Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) (lost wages an
element of damage award for lifeguard fired in retaliation for political speech).
Further, plaintiffs alleging wrongful arrest and imprisonment can often prove
special damages such as lost wages, medical expenses, and the costs of defending
malicious prosecution. In addition, if these plaintiffs were physically abused, the
trier of fact may award a discretionary sum as compensation for physical suffering.
See, e.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (loth Cir. 1963) (bodily injuries as
element of damages for trumped-up arrest and physical abuse by police officer);
Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (medical expenses, lost wages,
and costs of defending false charges as elements of damages for police assault);
McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (lost wages and out-
of-pocket expenses as elements of damages for false arrest of truckers).
Finally, victims of racial discrimination in housing may be awarded expenses
incurred in obtaining alternate living quarters. See, e.g., Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d
159 (5th Cir. 1977) (actual expenses awarded in suit against apartment-complex
operator); Jeanty v. McKey & Pogue, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974) (similar
expenses awarded against discriminatory realty agency); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F.
Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) (cost of alternate living arrangements and treatment
for resulting mental illness of wife compensated in suit based on housing-sale
discrimination).
87 "Actual" loss is used in this Comment to refer to loss that is proven in any
way, rather than presumed.
8For example, in Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974), a
racial housing discrimination case, the court upheld a $500 compensatory damages
award despite the defendant's claim that "'there is no evidence that the plaintiffs
suffered any loss or damages."' Id. But the Seventh Circuit's reasoning was per-
plexing: "[A]n award of compensatory damages under § 1982 or 'actual damages'
under [42 U.S.C.] § 3612 [§ 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88] is
appropriate for humiliation caused by the type of violations of rights established
here. Humiliation can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established
by the testimony." 491 F.2d at 636.
Many courts have also held that proven (including inferred) emotional distress
and humiliation caused by racial discrimination are compensable elements of dam-
age in cases in which some pecuniary loss was also shown. See, e.g., Gore v.
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These courts tread rather closely to the line of presuming damages,
because the protected interest in such cases is basically the right to
be treated with dignity, and the compensable "intangible" loss can
be described as loss of dignity. Thus, it would appear that com-
pensating for such intangible harm is virtually the same thing as
compensating for the loss of the right in and of itself. The "proof"
of intangible harm required, moreover, may amount to nothing
more than an inference derived from the nature of the violation
itself.39
Despite the doctrinal proximity between this method of de-
fining compensable injury and a presumption of substantial injury
owing to the violation itself, the proof-of-mental-distress approach
entails a procedure of evaluating the constitutional injury that
poses distinct difficulties. The trier of fact supposedly assigns a
dollar value to the intangible harm based on "proof," but, due to
the very nature of emotional harm, this proof can be of only the
most nebulous kind.40 When the plaintiff is required to prove his
mental anguish by direct testimony, as is often the case, only a
high-minded or disingenuous plaintiff will testify that he was
emotionally indifferent to the infringement of his rights. 41 Not
only is self-serving testimony about the plaintiff's subjective re-
actions to the violation of dubious reliability and utility, but re-
quiring constitutional tort damage awards to be based on such
testimony also turns the process of enforcement of constitutional
rights into a thespian contest to see who can make the most
Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977) (discrimination in apartment rentals);
Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977) (discrimination in apartment
rentals); Jeanty v. MeKey & Pogue, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974) (dis-
crimination in apartment rentals); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384
(10th Cir. 1973) (discrimination in apartment rentals); Smith v. Sol Adler Realty
Co., 436 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1970) (discrimination in apartment rentals);
Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) (discrimination in housing
sales); Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va.
1973) (discrimination in privately supported quasi-public schools), aff'd sub nom.
McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
39 See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d at 637-38.
40 The sort of emotional harm referred to in the text is that compensable by
general damages, and is often characterized as "distress," "humiliation," or "mental
anguish." Mental or emotional damage that is sufficiently serious to require therapy
or to lead to diminution of earning capacity is seldom involved in these cases.
But see Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) (racial discrimination
found to have aggravated emotional illness). The pecuniary losses associated with
such damage would of course be capable of relatively precise proof. On the sub-
ject of proof of intangible emotional harm, see Love, supra note 3, at 1268-70.
41 Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1977), a housing discrimination
suit brought by a black husband and white wife, in which the wife was denied
compensatory damages because she testified that she was not upset, is not a typical
case.
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sympathetic impression on the jury.42  One might well question
whether it is appropriate to offer substantially different amounts
of compensation to persons deprived of the same constitutional right
in a similar manner simply because one is a more demonstrative
witness than the other.
Even in cases in which direct testimony is dispensed with, and
the trier of fact is permitted to infer intangible injury from the
nature of the violation, the jury's largely unreviewable award is
likely to be determined primarily by the extent of its sympathy with
the plaintiff, which in turn may depend on his wealth, social status,
and personal appearance. The practical result may be that the
slum dweller's interests in liberty and security are seriously under-
valued relative to those of middle class plaintiffs. 43
42 The same objection applies to cases tried by a judge. The vindicatory func-
tion of constitutional tort suits is impaired whenever judicial attention is diverted
from the nature of the right violated to the emotional makeup of the individual
plaintiff thus permitting awards to vary freely with the discretion and sympathy of
the trier of fact. See note 43 infra for examples of the variations in awards from
one constitutional case to the next.
43 judge Newman, among others, has argued that middle-class juries habitually
undervalue the rights of plaintiffs from poorer segments of the community. See
Newman, supra note 4, at 454, 465. Newman states flatly that "[w]hen jurors
learn that a plaintiff has been in prison, as they frequently do when his credibility
is attacked by prior convictions, it is not unusual for them to value a few days of
his life in jail at a figure as low as $500." Id. 465. One student commentator
extends this argument to the exercise of unpopular rights: "The antimajoritarian
nature of constitutional guarantees further suggests that a jury reflecting community
standards may not fairly value the unpopular exercise of constitutional rights."
Harvard Note, supra note 8, at 988-89.
. For commentary on the perils of facing an unsympathetic jury-for whatever
reason-in constitutional tort cases, see Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising
Out of Violations of Civil Rights, 17 HAsTINGs L.J. 189, 203-04 (1965) (judges
and juries who are not members of minority groups "operate in a vacuum" when
they attempt to call upon their own experiences to measure damages in civil rights
cases); Note, Monetary Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial by jury,
8 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 613 (1973) (defendant's assertion of jury-trial right
may frustrate purpose of § 1983 in cases in which unpopular causes face potentially
hostile juries); Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Hazv. L. REv. 1109, 1264 n.371
(1971) (majority of jury demands in Title VII cases have come from southern
defendants in cases in which racial discrimination was alleged).
The theory that juries may undervalue the constitutional rights of less-favored
plaintiffs finds circumstantial support in the case law. Two unrelated cases together
suggest graphically the plight of the unpopular plaintiff. In Fisher v. Volz, 496
F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974), an award of $250 in punitive damages and no compensa-
tory damages for the occupants of each of several apartments invaded by the police
without probable cause was upheld despite evidence that the police caused physical
damage and exhibited flagrant disregard for the residents' rights. Y6t, in Rhoads
v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967), a $5000 compensatory and $2500
punitive damages award for arrest without probable cause and less than an hour's
detention was allowed despite the absence of any allegations of physical abuse.
The jury award had been even higher, but the trial judge ordered it reduced to
$7500 total. The plaintiffs in Fisher were black ghetto residents; the plaintiff in
Rhoads was a college professor.
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Basista v. Weir, 4 the widely cited Third Circuit case,45 illus-
trates a third approach to the problem of compensating consti-
tutional tort victims who cannot prove pecuniary loss: allowing
awards with both compensatory and punitive elements to pass
entirely under a "punitive" label. Basista was a section 1983 46
action in which the plaintiff claimed to have been beaten and
illegally arrested by a policeman. Plaintiff's counsel stated at a
pretrial conference that his client was not seeking any special dam-
ages but sought to recover for the deprivation of his constitutional
rights. 47 The jury, apparently confusing the concepts of "punitive"
and "compensatory" damages,48 awarded no compensatory and
$1500 punitive damages. The Third Circuit held that such an
award was permissible-that nominal damages could be presumed
from the deprivation of a right to which the plaintiff was entitled
and that such damages were sufficient to support a punitive award.49
Like the proof-of-mental-distress approach, the Basista court's
doctrinal amendment, though designed to approximate the practical
result of presuming damage, falls short in both theory and reality.
The award in Basista must logically have contained a compensatory
element, despite its label. In order to find for Basista on the
merits, the jury had to believe at least some of his evidence regard-
ing his illegal arrest and detention. If Basista's fourth amendment
rights were really worth nothing, or only a nominal amount, in the
jury's eyes-as would appear from its failure to award any com-
pensatory damages-it is difficult to see why the jurors were moved
to exact a $1500 "punishment" from the defendant for violating
them. Yet the Third Circuit's willingness to tolerate erosion of the
compensatory/punitive distinction allowed it to avoid formulating
adequate rules for compensatory awards in constitutional cases in
which pecuniary loss cannot be shown.
44340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
45 Basista has been cited by the Supreme Court, with apparent approval, in
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 264 n.22 (1978), and Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The lower
federal courts have also frequently cited Basista. See, e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524
F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1975); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d at 637;
Fisher v. Voz, 496 F.2d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 1974); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d
738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970); Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (D.D.C.
1974); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
4642 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 1980). The full text of § 1983 is provided at
note 3 supra.
47 "'I said there is no special damage except, well, compensatory or punitive
but both for the same thing. It is a violation of the civil rights."' 340 F.2d at 85.
48 See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
49 340 F.2d at 87-88.
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Future Basista-like plaintiffs to whom punitive damages are not
available, either because a defendant acted with insufficient bad
faith, 0 or because a defendant is a government agency immune
from liability for punitive damages, 1 would, under Basista, be
entitled only to nominal damages for the violation of their con-
stitutional rights.6 2 The Basista court quoted an 1896 opinion in
support of its holding:
[T]here is neither sense nor reason in the proposition that
[punitive] damages may be recovered by a plaintiff who is
able to show that he has lost $10, and may not be recovered
by some other plaintiff who has sustained, it may be, far
greater injury, but is unable to prove that he is poorer in
pocket by the wrongdoing of defendant.0
Yet it is hardly more sensible that one's ability to recover substantial
damages should depend entirely on either the subjective state of
mind or statutory immunity from punitive damages of the de-
fendant in a particular action.
C. The Presumed Damages Approach
Unlike the approaches discussed above, the doctrine of pre-
sumed damages directs the trier of fact's focus not to the subjective
reactions of the individual plaintiff or to the degree of malice ex-
hibited by the defendant, but to the nature of the right violated.
The doctrine of presumed damages requires the jury in a
constitutional tort case to make three separate inquiries. Although
these determinations are not "easy," the jury's task under a pre-
sumed damages instruction has the advantage of being logical in
light of the policies of Bivens and section 1983 actions 4 First,
50 See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
51 The Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, disallows punitive damage awards
against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). See Love, supra note 4, at
1282.
Note that this is one situation in which § 1983 plaintiffs are treated differ-
ently than Bivens plaintiffs. Because the defendant in a Bivens action is statutorily
immune from punitive damage awards, the Basista approach is of little relevance
in that context. See generally note 2 supra.
52 The district court's decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 434 F. Supp. at 1195,
is an illustration of this concept. Unwilling to hold that the defendants, all high
government officials, had been "reckless, wanton or malicious," to recognize a pre-
sumption of damages, or to engage in speculation about emotional distress, the trial
court restricted the Halperins to one dollar nominal damages. Halperin is discussed
more fully below. See notes 91-107 infra & accompanying text.
5 3 Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d at 87-88 (quoting Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73
F. 196, 201 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 164 U.S. 105 (1896)).
54 See text following note 6 supra.
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even if the plaintiff has submitted no proof on the amount of
injury he suffered, the jury should be permitted to compensate him
for the violation of his constitutional right. The jury should
determine, in the light of its common experience, what amount
would be sufficient to compensate a citizen for the loss of the right
in question. Second, the jury should consider, in determining the
sum necessary to compensate for invasion of the right, whether the
violation was of the sort that would cause a reasonable person to
suffer such consequential injury as mental distress, embarrassment,
and humiliation. Finally, the jury should determine whether the
defendant should be punished for his conduct. If so, that punish-
ment should be expressed only through an express award of punitive
damages. In setting compensatory damages, in contrast, the de-
fendant's conduct is relevant only to determining the magnitude
of the deprivation to be compensated. For example, unreasonable
wiretapping for six months is a greater constitutional violation than
unreasonable wiretapping for six days and merits a higher com-
pensatory award. In the context of the jury's compensatory award,
however, a six day wiretap by a defendant who acted out of personal
spite is a violation of the same magnitude as a six day wiretap by a
defendant who merely acted unreasonably.
Despite the clear surface logic of the presumed damages solu-
tion to the problem of compensating for the deprivation of con-
stitutional rights, the doctrine is hinged on the assumption, not yet
discussed, that such rights can reasonably be assigned a dollar value.
This Comment's next task is to examine the validity of such an
assumption.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Hague v. Committee for Indus-
trial Organization 5 supports the view that first and fourth amend-
ment rights may, at least in the abstract, be assigned a dollar value.
Although the CIO, alleging violation of both first and fourth
amendment rights, sought an injunction rather than damages, an
issue was raised whether the amount-in-controversy minimum for
federal jurisdiction was metP6 The court held that the amount in
controversy should be determined by the value of the rights of
which plaintiffs alleged deprivation and that the trial judge's find-
ing, that the jurisdictional requirement was met, could be taken as
a finding that plaintiffs could have recovered such an amount in a
55 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
56 Id. 789-90. The amount-in-controversy requirement in 1939 was only $3000.
See Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)), cited in Hague, 101 F.2d at 789.
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suit at law for deprivation of the same rights. 57 Such a finding,
moreover, need not be based on specific evidence of value, "but
rather upon the trial judge's own knowledge and opinion as to the
value." 58
The voting rights cases 59 also support the notion that reasonable
people can assign monetary values to intangible rights. According
to this line of authority, "the amount of the damages is a question
peculiarly appropriate for the determination of the jury, because
each member of the jury has personal knowledge of the value of
the right." 00
Thus, the underlying assumption of the presumed damages
doctrine-that constitutional rights can rationally be assigned dollar
values-has some validity. This Comment takes the additional step
of arguing that it is primarily the jury's-as opposed to the judge's
or Congress's-function, at least in the first instance, to set the value
of constitutional rights in particular cases."' Concededly, leaving the
valuation of constitutional rights to jurors does present potential
problems. But these problems are readily solvable through tradi-
tional mechanisms of judicial review.
7 ld.
58Id. 790. Other constitutional tort cases recognize the inherent value of con-
stitutional rights by finding that the "minimum amount' jurisdictional requirement
is satisfied. See, e.g., Hartigh v. Latin, 485 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (§ 1983
action against police officers for excessive use of force meets the $10,000 threshold
for federal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Sullivan v. Murphy,
478 F.2d 938, 960 (D.C. Cir.) (allegation of unlawful arrests at antiwar demon-
strations sufficient to pass the $10,000 federal jurisdiction requirement), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 880 (1973); Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(complaint against police alleging constitutional violations need only be made in
good faith, and the amount sued for is deemed to have been fixed in good faith
as long as it is not "clear to a legal certainty" that no recovery could satisfy the
jurisdictional minimum); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (3d Cir. 1972)
(first amendment rights, though difficult to value precisely, are capable of sustain-
ing claims for damages in excess of the $10,000 federal jurisdictional minimum).50 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir.
1919).
60 Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. at 66.
61 Compare the approach of Judge Newman who advocates providing, in addi-
tion to compensatory damages for actual losses, "a liquidated damage sum to com-
pensate for the value of the constitutional right denied." Newman, supra note 4,
at 465. He proposes either a constant amount or an amount to vary according to
a schedule for different violations and different consequences. This proposal pre-
sumably would be accomplished by statute. Newman also suggests that juries not
be informed that the liquidated damage figure would be added to its actual loss
award, to prevent any temption to deflate its own assessment accordingly.
Other commentators have also offered proposals involving legislative action to
implement some form of presumed damages. See Love, supra note 4, at 1282-85
(urging legislation to accomplish the goals of the presumed damages doctrine);




Two 1977 District of Columbia Circuit cases involving police
disruption of political demonstrations illustrate both the wide
variations that can occur among evaluations of the same right by
different triers of fact, and the capacity of judicial review to even
out these discrepancies. In Tatum v. Morton,6 2 the court of appeals
held that it was error to limit a group of Quakers who were un-
lawfully arrested during a demonstration to $100 each in damages,
plus lost wages. Remanding for the trial court to set an award some-
where between that $100 figure and the $10,000 each plaintiff
sought, Judge Levanthal's opinion stressed the need to compensate
the demonstrators for the loss of their constitutionally protected
freedom of speech. 3 In Dellums v. Powell, 4 on the other hand,
the same circuit set aside as excessive an award of $7500 to each of a
group of demonstrators who were arrested in contravention of their
first amendment rights, and to the congressman who was addressing
them at the time of the arrests. Here, because the demonstration
was virtually completed before any arrests were made, the court felt
that the quantum of first amendment freedom lost was too small to
support such a large award.65 The trial judge's instructions had not
focused sufficiently on the relatively minimal nature of this infringe-
ment: "The jury cannot simply be set loose to work its discretion
informed only by platitudes about priceless rights." 66
These cases may be read together to demonstrate that, although
intangible constitutional rights can be assigned a monetary value,
some system of review of such valuations is necessary to ensure that
constitutional deprivations of similar character and magnitude are
compensated in a similar fashion. Juries' judgments, based on the
jurors' common experience of what a given right is worth, should
be more susceptible of direct comparison than judgments about a
given plaintiff's sensitivity to emotional distress, for example. Over
time, therefore, conscious use of the presumed damages doctrine
would permit trial judges and appellate courts to exercise more
effectively the needed review of compensatory damage awards for
the class of torts to which the presumption applies than could
possibly be exercised under either of the alternative approaches dis-
cussed above.
67
62 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63 Id. 1282.
64566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
05 Id. 195-96.
66 Id.
67 See notes 37-53 supra & accompanying text.
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Initially, the trial judge could guide the jury's damage award
through his instructions to the jury. If, despite the instructions,
the jury awarded the plaintiff a sum disproportionate to damages
awarded by other juries for similar injuries, the judge could then
exercise one of several remedial options available to him. Should
the jury's verdict appear excessive, the judge could order a re-
mittitur of the excess portion of the award 68 or a new trial. In
the case of an inadequate award, the judge does not have the
comparable option of ordering an additur; 69 rather, he is limited
to ordering a new trial. The new trial option in either case may,
however, be limited to the damages issue; the issue of liability need
not be relitigated.70 Finally, traditional appellate review of either
excessive or inadequate jury awards remains available.71
6 8 The doctrine of remittitur was examined critically by the Supreme Court in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). The Court suggested that it might not
sanction the practice "if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first
time." Id. 484. The Court noted, however, that "the doctrine has been accepted
as the law for more than a hundred years and uniformly applied in the federal
courts during that time." Id. 484-85. In light of this history, as well as the use
of the practice in England before the adoption of the constitution, the Court con-
cluded that "we may assume that in a case involving a remittitur . . . the doctrine
would not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day." Id. 485. For a discussion
of the history and the mechanics of the doctrine of remittitur, see generally 6A 3.
MooaE, MOORE's FEDERAL PAcrsnc ff 59.05[31 (1979); Carlin, Remittiturs and
Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942); Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal
Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 299 (1976).
t The practice of additur was declared unconstitutional, as violative of the
seventh amendment, in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). See generally
6A J. MooRE, supra note 68, at ff 59.05[41. Since Dimick, additur has not been
permitted in the federal courts, see, e.g., Miller v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.,
220 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955), at least when the right to a jury trial is founded on
the seventh amendment, see generally United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battle-
field Ass'n, 99 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 646 (1939).
7 0 See 6A J. MooPE, supra note 68, at 1 59.06.
71 The Supreme Court has upheld statutes directing appellate review of capital
punishment sentences to ensure that the circumstances of the case were similar to
those in which the death penalty had been imposed in the past. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). These and related
cases are discussed in The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAM. L. REV. 56, 63-76
(1976).
Of course, the interest of a constitutional tort plaintiff in receiving a fair dam-
age award is not of the same magnitude as a defendant's interest in not receiving
the death penalty unfairly. But basic trial judge supervision coupled with appellate
review should not require too great an expenditure of judicial resources. In fact, the
more straightforward presumed damages approach should represent a move towards
conservation of judicial resources when contrasted with the unprincipled, free-
wheeling review currently exercised. See notes 37-53 supra and notes 146-55 infra
& accompanying text.
The only possible judicial resource objection to this Comment's approach to
the presumed damages inquiry is that too many new trials may result as a conse-
quence of this system. Such an objection would have to rely on the assumption
that many plaintiffs would refuse to accept remittiturs in the excessive verdict cases
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This sort of gentle guidance of jury discretion should not
threaten any important values of the jury system. Juries will still
express societal values in their assessments of the worth of various
constitutional rights. Trial judges and appellate courts will merely
ensure some degree of comparability between awards for similar
violations through devices such as the remittitur and new-trial
order, on the theory that a jury assessment grossly out of line with
what other juries have assessed in similar circumstances would
likely be based on some impermissible prejudice or misapprehen-
sion. The value of allowing a jury to weigh evidence is not strongly
implicated here, because the presumption will come into play only
in cases in which there is little or no competent evidence bearing
on the damage issue.72 The presumption and special supervision
and review would apply only to that aspect of the injury that is
the same from case to case: the deprivation by a government
agency or official of a citizen's right to free expression (as in a
politically motivated firing case); a citizen's interest in liberty and
personal security (as in an unreasonable arrest and detention case);
or a citizen's interest in privacy (as in a wiretapping case).
and on the unavailability of the additur option in the undervaluation cases thus
resulting in frequent new trial orders.
This argument must be rejected for three reasons. First, it is not at all clear
that new trials will result from any significant portion of new trial orders by either
trial judges or appellate courts. It appears reasonable to assume that most of those
cases will settle prior to any retrial of the issues. The judge, or court ordering the
new trial can even push the parties towards settlement by indicating what he thinks
would be a fair award under the circumstances. See, e.g., Huntley v. Community
School Bd., 579 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1978) (trial judge said that he would have
awarded at least $1000 for this violation of constitutional rights).
Second, to the extent that new trials do result, they need not be full-blown
trials on the merits. Retrial of only the plaintiffs damage claims should not present
too great a burden on valuable judicial resources. See 6A J. MoonE, supra note
68, at It 59.06.
Finally, this Comment takes the position that the vindication of constitutional
rights is a sufficiently consequential societal interest that whatever increased burden
on judicial resources results is more than offset by the benefits of implementing a
presumed damages approach.
Thus, when contrasting the various proposals for legislative action discussed
by other commentators, see note 61 supra, with this Comment's approach leaving
the presumption of damages to trial judges, juries, and appellate courts, the ad-
vantage of the legislative approaches with respect to conservation of judicial re-
sources is quite slight. And the legislative proposals do have one significant
disadvantage. This Comment's alternative approach would preserve more flexibility
than legislatively decreed liquidated damages or a fixed minimum recovery. Juries
would retain the power to tailor awards according to the magnitude of the violation
(e.g., the length of the wiretap or illegal detention or the presence of mitigating
or exacerbating circumstances). It would be relatively difficult to draft a statute
taking such variations in magnitude into account. Also, juries could adjust the
range of awards for changes in the cost of living as often as necessary, whereas a
statute would have to be periodically amended.
72 Special damages, if any, could still be separately pleaded, proved, and
awarded.
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II. PRESUMED DAMAGES IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT
Barring legislative action, the Supreme Court's decision in
Carey v. Piphus73 forecloses the presumed damages option in the
procedural due process context. But Piphus did leave open the
possibility that the presumed damages concept might be appropriate
to remedy violations of other constitutional rights.74 This section
explores the impact of Piphus on fourth amendment cases involving
purely intangible harm, focusing specifically on the wiretapping
of Morton Halperin's home during the Nixon administration.
A. Carey v. Piphus
A close examination of Justice Powell's opinion in Piphus
reveals that the Court's holding was based on the notion that
procedural due process violations, in and of themselves, are not
sufficiently likely to cause substantial intangible harm to justify
relieving plaintiffs of their burden of proof on the issue.75 The
Court's essential concern was with the differences it perceived be-
tween violations of procedural and violations of substantive con-
stitutional rights.
Plaintiffs had contended that damages should be presumed to
flow from their deprivation of procedural due process, analogizing
their case to one of defamation. 76 The Court agreed that presumed
damages would be appropriate in a case of defamation, noting that
defamation is likely to cause serious injury, both reputational and
emotional. Injury to reputation, the Court stated, is often quite
difficult to prove; furthermore, such injury, like emotional distress,
is so likely to occur that "there arguably is little reason to require
proof of [either] kind of injury." 77
The Court rejected the presumed damages approach in the
procedural due process area, however, finding several crucial dis-
tinctions between deprivations of this nature and the defamation
example. First, the Court stated that it was not reasonable to
73 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
74 See notes 84-88 infra & accompanying text. Following the decision in Piphus,
the Fourth Circuit approved a presumed damages approach for a fourteenth amend-
ment claim. Mickens v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Va. 1978) (black
prisoner protested segregated conditions in city jail), aff'd mem., 609 F.2d 508
(4th Cir. 1979). See notes 89 & 90 infra & accompanying text.
75 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Indeed, the Court stated that "[p]ro-
cedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation,






presume that injury is as likely to occur from a deprivation of pro-
cedural due process as from the infringement upon one's rights
that occurs in the case of defamation.
78
Second, the Court felt that "where a deprivation [of a 'pro-
tected interest' or substantive right] is justified but procedures are
inadequate, whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to
the justified deprivation rather than to deficiencies in procedure." 79
There would, then, be two possible causes of the plaintiff's distress:
the procedural deprivation, which would be compensable upon
proof of injury, and the justified deprivation of a substantive right,
which, being justified, would not be compensable.80 This "ambigu-
ity in causation," which does not occur in a defamation case, was
felt to provide a strong reason for requiring the plaintiff to prove
that his distress was actually caused by the procedural deficiency
itself.8A
Finally, noting that "[d]istress is a personal injury familiar
to the law," 82 the Court "fore[saw] no particular difficulty in pro-
ducing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was
caused by the denial of procedural due process itself." 8
Far from expressing a broad rule that damage may not be pre-
sumed to flow from the violation of all constitutional rights, the
Court in Piphus carefully limited its holding to the context of
violations that are merely procedural.84 Rejecting the plaintiffs'
reliance on racial discrimination, voting rights, and fourth amend-
ment cases " without expressing any opinion on the continuing
vitality of the cases cited, Justice Powell stressed that "the elements
and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compen-
sate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right
are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the
78 Id. 263.
Where the deprivation of a protected interest is substantively justified but
procedures are deficient in some respect, there may well be those who
suffer no distress over the procedural irregularities. Indeed, in contrast
to the immediately distressing effect of a defamation per se, a person may
not even know that procedures were deficient until he enlists the aid of
counsel to challenge a perceived substantive deprivation.
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deprivation of another." 88 Moreover, Justice Powell stated that
"the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the in-
terests protected by the particular right in question-just as the
common-law rules of damages themselves were defined by the in-
terests protected in the various branches of tort law." 87 Thus,
under the governing principles of Piphus, the likelihood that sub-
stantial and difficult-to-prove harm will flow directly from or inhere
in the invasion of a given constitutionally protected interest in most
cases involving infringement of that particular right is the key to
determining whether the victim of such an invasion should be
relieved of the burden of proving harm.""
At least one court has already faithfully implemented the
Piphus inquiry in the context of the fourteenth amendment. In
Mickens v. Winston, 9 the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia reviewed the history and nature of the equal protection
right and segregation and concluded that "[a]lthough plaintiff has
failed to vocalize, with any specificity, his alleged injury, confining
his testimony to 'feeling bad' by virtue of defendant's intentional
policy of racial segregation, the Court concludes he was pre-
sumptively injured, for which he is entitled to a monetary award." 90
B. Halperin v. Kissinger
Halperin v. Kissinger91 squarely presented the question
whether substantial damages should be presumed to flow from wire-
tapping in violation of the fourth amendment . 2 Morton Halperin,
86 Id.
87 Id. 259.
8 8 Thus, the Court was able to conclude as follows:
In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial
of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold that
neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so
great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such
injury actually was caused.
Id. 264.
89462 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd mere., 609 F.2d 508 (4th Cir.
1979). In Mickens, the plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated in a segregated jail, was
relieved of the burden of proving injury. The plaintiff's claim was grounded in
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
90 Id. 913.
91424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976) (liability); 434 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C.
1977) (damages), rev'd in part and remanded, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2915 (1980) (No. 79-880).
92 Only the constitutional damages issue in Halperin will be discussed in this
Comment. The circuit court remanded the case for a determination of several
additional factual issues. Constitutional remedies will apply only to the portion of
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an aide to former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and
his family sued Kissinger, former President Richard Nixon, former
Attorney General John Mitchell, and other federal officials 93 al-
legedly responsible for placing and maintaining a tap on the
Halperins' home telephone for a twenty-one month period in 1969
through 1971. Although the ostensible purpose of the tap was to
obtain information regarding leaks of national security information
to the press, it never yielded any information on this subject."
The Halperins claimed that the tap was maintained, even after an
FBI recommendation that it be discontinued,9 5 because the White
House found information about Halperin's private political activ-
ities useful."" At no point did the defendants seek a court order
for the surveillance, 7 nor did they make any attempt to avoid
eavesdropping on calls that were of a purely familial nature.98
Although the district court held that this surveillance violated
the fourth amendment, 9 the court concluded that the plaintiffs'
failure to plead and prove "actual" damages precluded them from
recovering more than one dollar in nominal damages.100 The
court of appeals agreed that the fourth amendment's reasonableness
requirement was likely violated by some portion of the wiretap 101
but found it necessary to remand the case. In so doing, it instructed
the lower court to allow plaintiffs to "show loss due to emotional
distress and mental anguish .... Such harm might be demon-
strated through direct testimony of the plaintiffs or might be
'inferred from the circumstances,' and if established would surely
entitle the Halperins to more than nominal recovery." 102 Plain-
tiffs' failure to offer proof of such injury in the summary proceed-
the 21 month tap that the district court determines to have been in violation of
the fourth amendment and not a violation of title HI, supra note 10, which took
effect in mid-tap.
93The other defendants were presidential aides H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlich-
man, Alexander Haig, and Jeb Magruder; FBI Director Clarence Kelly; FBI official
William Sullivan; Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian; and the Chesapeake
and Potomac Telephone Company.





99 424 F. Supp. at 843. The District Court refused to apply title M, supra
note 10, to any portion of the tap. 424 F. Supp. at 841-42. This holding was
reversed by the court of appeals. 606 F.2d at 1205-06.
100 434 F. Supp. at 1194-95.
101 606 F.2d at 1206.
102 Id. 1208 (footnote omitted).
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ings below was attributed to a "pre-Piphus belief that injury should
be presumed." 103
Judge Wright's opinion for the court of appeals recognized
that Carey v. Piphus ought not to control the damage issue
in Halperin,04 because "[t]he substantive rights asserted by the
Halperins are of a much different character" from the procedural
due process rights involved in Piphus.1°5 But the court apparently
concluded that allowing the Halperins to "prove" injury under a
liberal standard 106 would be an equally effective, and less con-
troversial, method of compensating the plaintiff in this case than
would open approval of the presumed damages concept. Of course,
the circuit court failed to acknowledge both the practical difficulties
and logical deficiencies that inhere in such a damages theory.'07
C. Damages for Unreasonable Wiretapping After Piphus
Tested by Piphus's standards, the unconstitutional invasion of
the Halperins' privacy was a deprivation for which a presumption
of injury is appropriate. The right involved in Halperin-the
fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures-is a substantive one not posing the difficulties in causation
perceived by the Piphus Court. Further, because the common law
permitted the use of the doctrine of presumed damages in analogous
invasion-of-privacy cases, Piphus's instruction to examine common
law analogues provides additional support for any decision to pre-
sume damages in the fourth amendment area.
1. The Substance/Procedure Distinction
The motivating force behind the enactment of the fourth
amendment was the desire to secure the citizens' substantive right
103 Id. 1207 n.103.
104 Note that, though Halperin was a Bivens action, the District of Columbia
Circuit did not attempt to distinguish Piphus as a § 1983 proceeding. Presumably,
this was a direct result of the near identity between the elements and standards
applicable to both § 1983 and Bivens actions. See note 2 supra. In fact, the
Piphus Court relied on Bivens itself, at least in part, to establish that the com-
pensation of injuries is one of the purposes of § 1983. See Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. at 255. See generally Harvard Note, supra note 8, at 973-74.
105 606 F.2d at 1207 n.100.
10 6 In an apparent effort to ensure that the Halperins receive a generous
opportunity to prove injury, the court noted that "in cases involving constitutional
rights, compensation 'should not be approached in a niggardly spirit. It is in the
public interest that there be a reasonably spacious approach to a fair compensatory
award for denial or curtailment of the right * *."' Id. 1208 (quoting Tatum
v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
107 See text accompanying notes 37-53 supra.
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to security from unwarranted intrusions into privacy by the govern-
ment.108 As the court of appeals in Halperin stated:
Although the technology of investigation has developed
dramatically in the last century, the dangers of unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into citizens' private lives
have not changed since Justice Bradley wrote in Boyd v.
United States:
It is not the breaking of [a man's] doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion of his inde-
feasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property * * * .* *
Without vigilant protection of a private space in which
each citizen is free to pursue his own ideas and aspirations,
we would betray our vision of a society based on the
dignity of the individual.0 9
It is this substantive guaranty of privacy that provides the
basis of the Halperins' cause of action. That this privacy is highly
valued by the American people is implicit in the Constitution." 0
It is reasonable to assume that injury will result from a violation
of this privacy, just as injury may be presumed to flow from defama-
tion."' There is no "ambiguity of causation" 112 problem present;
any distress the Halperins felt was quite clearly caused by the actual
invasion of their privacy, and not by any underlying "justified
deprivation." 113 While it might not be impossible to prove some
'0 8 See notes 123-31 infra & accompanying text.
109 606 F.2d at 1199-1200 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886) (footnote omitted) ).
"
0OSee Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
Ml1 See notes 77 & 78 supra & accompanying text.
112 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 263.
113 Id. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra. It is true that in some
cases a reasonable governmental intrusion on privacy will violate the fourth
amendment only because of a failure to obtain a prior judicial warrant. For
example, in United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the
Court stated:
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government's surveillance of
Plamondon's conversations was a reasonable one which readily would
have gained prior judicial approval. But this Court "has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find
evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to
the least intrusive means consistent with that end." . . . The Fourth
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that
executive discretion may be reasonably exercised.
Id. 317 (footnote and citation omitted).
In such cases, the logic of Piphus might arguably require the target of the
search to prove that he suffered some intangible or tangible harm proximately
1980i
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emotional distress from the invasion of privacy, 114 the Halperins'
outrage at discovering that they had been wiretapped is so likely
that forcing them to introduce evidence on the matter would be
superfluous, as is proof of emotional distress in defamation
actions." 5 Further, use of the presumed damages concept is par-
ticularly appropriate in an invasion-of-privacy case, because other-
wise the process of proof would compound the Halperins' injury by
forcing them to disclose in court the nature and content of the
private conversations that the government unlawfully overheard.
2. Common Law Analogues
The Piphus Court suggested that, when a constitutional viola-
tion has a close analogue in the common law of torts, courts should
inform their judgment on the rules necessary to remedy the con-
stitutional wrong by looking to the common law response to the
analogous problem.' 6 Because the Halperins' fourth amendment
claim is closely related to the common law tort of invasion of
privacy, the acceptance of the presumed damages doctrine in that
context supports the extension of the presumption to certain
modem fourth amendment claims, including the Halperins', under
the reasoning of Piphus.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "intrusion upon
seclusion," one of four distinct types of invasion of privacy, as
intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, "upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs, . . if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." 117 Wiretapping
falls under this type of invasion of privacy." 8 Proof of invasion of
privacy alone entitled a plaintiff to recover damages for the
,caused by the lack of a warrant rather than by the search itself in order to recover
more than nominal damages. See notes 78-83 supra & accompanying text. In
Halperin, however, the failure to obtain a warrant cannot be seen as a merely
procedural defect because the surveillance was specifically found to have been
unreasonable, a "dragnet which lacked temporal and spatial limitation." 424
F. Supp. at 843. And, of course, an official warrant can never legitimate an
unreasonable search and seizure. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886) (holding that the fourth amendment incorporates the English common
law condemnation of general warrants); notes 123-31 infra & accompanying text
(discussing the general warrant cases' holdings that a warrant cannot legitimate an
unreasonable search or seizure).
114 See note 122 infra.
115 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 262; text accompanying note 77 supra.
116 435 U.S. at 257-58.
I 7 ERsTAmNT (SEcoun) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
118 Id. Comment b, illustration 3.
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presumed "harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the
invasion." 119
Professor Dobbs states expressly that phone tapping would be
a dignitary tort at common law.120 In the dignitary tort class of
cases, "damages are 'presumed,' or the wrong is said to be damage
in and of itself." 1 Thus, in a common law action on a tort such
as wiretapping, the plaintiff's damage recovery would not "require
proof of emotional harm to the plaintiff." 122
The well-known series of English cases from the 1760's estab-
lishing the illegality of general warrants 123 also provides an inter-
esting, if imperfect, analogue to the Halperins' situation. In each
of these cases, substantial damages were awarded to the victims of
searches and arrests executed under authority of the invalid war-
rants, even though the searches caused no physical damage and the
arrestees were detained for only short periods. 24 In Entick v.
Carrington,25 for example, the jury awarded £300 damages against
the warrant's executors for trespassing into the plaintiff's home by
means of an unlocked door, interfering with his right to possession
for four hours, and reading and taking away some of his private
papers.' 20  In Huckle v. Money, 27 the same sum was awarded to a
19 Id. § 652H.
120D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at § 7.3, at 530. Other dignitary torts at
common law would include assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecu-
tion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, alienation of affections, interference
with voting and other electoral rights, and other invasions of privacy. Id. § 7.3,
at 528-29.
121 Id. § 7.3, at 528.
122 Id. § 7.3, at 529. Professor Dobbs goes on to explain:
On the other hand, emotional distress is a strong element in the
dignitary tort cases and accounts for a substantial portion of the damages
award.
Indeed in some of the cases, the tort looks very much like a special
version of inflicting emotional distress. This is true in some cases of
privacy invasion, as when the plaintiff is harassed, or shadowed, or his
phone is tapped.
Id. § 7.3, at 530 (footnote omitted).
123 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (£300 award for
breaking into plaintiff's home and searching for papers); Beardmore v. Carrington,
95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B. 1764) (91000 award for breaking into plaintiff's home,
seizing books and papers, and imprisoning plaintiff for six days); Huckle v.
Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763) (9300 award for six hours imprisonment
and seizure of papers); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763) (£100D
award for breaking into plaintiff's home and seizing papers). See also Redshaw
v. Brook, 95 Eng. Rep. 887 (M.B. 1769) (£200 award for entering home without
a warrant and searching for twenty minutes).
124The damages awarded ranged from £200 to £I000. See note 107 supra.
125 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (M.B. 1765).
E2 Id. 807.
127 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
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journeyman printer detained for six hours under a general warrant,
although the defendants "used him very civilly by treating him
with beef-steaks and beer, so that he suffered very little or no
damages." 128 The Lord Chief Justice, upholding this award against
an excessiveness attack, stated:
[T]he personal injury done to him was very small, so that
if the jury had been confined by their oath to consider the
mere personal injury only, perhaps 20 [pounds] damages
would have been thought damages sufficient; but the small
injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his
station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that
striking light in which the great point of law touching the
liberty of the subject appeared to them at the trial ....
[I]t was a most daring public attack made upon the liberty
of the subject.12 9
The awards in these cases undoubtedly contained a punitive
element, 30 which the English juries were not required to label sep-
arately.13' But they nevertheless illustrate the zealous protection
at common law of intangible interests in liberty and security, a
goal accomplished by awarding substantial damages for the infringe-
ment of such interests, even in the absence of physical or economic
harm or evidence of unusual emotional distress.
D. Lower Court Use of the Presumed Damages Doctrine
Further support for this Comment's thesis, that the presumed
damages doctrine is an appropriate remedial tool in the fourth
amendment context, can be found in the number of lower court
128 Id. 768.
129 Id. 768-69.
130 The cases may not be fairly dismissed as involving only punishment,
however. The cases stressed three ideas: the high inherent value of the rights
violated; the need to deter similar conduct in the future; and the need to punish
the perpetrators of the tortious searches and seizures. For example, in Wilkes, the
Lord Chief Justice stated that
a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury
received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any
such proceeding in the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the
jury to the action itself.
98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99. Only the criterion of "punishment to the guilty" is,
according to American notions of the line between punitive and compensatory
damages, purely a "punitive" concept. See notes 16-21 supra & accompanying text.
131 See note 22 supra & accompanying text. One commentator suggests that
"exemplary damages" are viewed in England not as punishment, but as compen-




cases recognizing that compensation for deprivation of civil rights
is a permissible element of a general damage award, even when
there is evidence of other sorts of injury.132 Although the plaintiffs
in many of these cases proved special damages, such as lost wages
and medical expenses, or such relatively "concrete" types of general
damage as pain from physical abuse and incarceration, an undefined
portion of the total award is often attributed to the invasion of
civil rights itself.
133
Three unlawful arrest cases from district courts in New York,
Texas, and Colorado are typical of this line of cases. In Manfredonia
v. Barry,34 the plaintiffs were awarded $3500 compensatory and
$500 punitive damages for the unlawful arrest itself, one night's
detention, and the notoriety resulting from the episode. Although
no physical or pecuniary loss was alleged, the court cited Wayne
v. Venable,35 the famous case applying the presumed damages
doctrine to voting rights violations, for the proposition that depriva-
tion of a constitutional right by a government official is itself
sufficient ground for the recovery of substantial compensatory
damages. 3 6 In Sexton v. Gibbs'3 T the plaintiff neither claimed nor
submitted proof of actual damage caused by his illegal arrest and
the illegal search of his car. Nevertheless, the court noted that the
"plaintiff suffered humiliation, embarrassment and discomfort in
addition to being deprived of his federally protected rights," 18s
and awarded a total of $750 in damages. Finally, in Rhoads v.
Horvat,39 evidence that the plaintiff was outraged by his arrest and
brief detention, that he was afraid he would be unable to keep a
date that evening, and that he was upset when his teaching col-
leagues jokingly referred to him as a "jailbird," was found sufficient
to support an award of $5000 compensatory and $2500 exemplary
damages.140 Again, the court cited Wayne v. Venable for the prop-
132 Although most lower federal court cases that have presumed damages were
decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Piphus, the logic of their analyses
remains valid. See notes 142-45 infra & accompanying text.
'33See, e.g., Rue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) ($650
award for false arrest with no physical injury, only $96 actual loss); Brooks v.
Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 1965) ($3500 compensatory award for police
assault includes element for "deprivation of rights as a citizen"); notes 134-41
infra & accompanying text.
134 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
135 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919). See notes 29 & 32 supra & accompanying text.
136 401 F. Supp. at 770.
'37 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
138 Id. 143.
'39 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
140 Id. 309-11.
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osition that the amount of general damages for the invasion of a
civil right was up to the jury.141
To be sure, all of the cases cited and discussed above were
decided prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Carey v. Piphus.
But the logic underlying the decisions in those cases-that violations
of civil rights are compensable even without proof of actual loss-
survives the Supreme Court's Piphus decision. The Court in
Piphus carefully and expressly limited its holding to the violation
of constitutional rights that are merely procedural. 4 2 The Court
even cited the aforementioned lower court cases,143 discussed
them,144 distinguished them from the situation then confronting it,
and found them not "controlling." 145
Even so, with few exceptions, 146 the lower courts have generally
appeared extremely hesitant, since the Piphus decision, to employ
the doctrine of presumed damages, even in cases in which violations
of a substantive constitutional right have occurred. This re-
luctance, which often occurs despite the lower court's express
recognition that Piphus ought not to be controlling, has resulted
in some rather strained efforts on the part of the courts to com-
pensate plaintiffs for deprivations of substantive constitutional
rights without presuming damages.'
47
141 Id. 309.
142 435 U.S. at 262-65. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
143 435 U.S. at 264-65 n.22.
144 Id. 264-65 & n.22.
145Id. 265.
'
46 See Bryant v. McGinnis, 463 F. Supp. 373, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (§ 1983
case by prisoners asserting first amendment rights; court cited an unusual string
of cases, including Piphus, in support of the proposition that substantial non-
punitive damages can be awarded under § 1983 for violations of constitutional
rights involving "deprivation of intangible rights for which no pecuniary loss can
be shown"; awarded $3000 in compensatory damages to each plaintiff); Mickens
v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd mem., 609 F.2d 508 (4th
Cir. 1979) (see notes 89 & 90 supra & accompanying text).
147 See, e.g., Williams v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys., No. 77-2305
(5th Cir. June 5, 1980) (first amendment firing case; jury awarded $20,750
compensatory, $28,000 punitive, and two cents nominal damages; compensatory
award upheld for "doubt and resulting anguish" during the campaign despite plain-
tiff's subsequent victory in the election); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13 (7th
Cir. 1979) (unlawful arrest and search case; jury awarded husband and wife a
total of $12,500 compensatory and $23,500 punitive damages on proof of only
$576 in lost wages; court of appeals upheld compensatory award under Piphus,
because the rights involved in this case were substantive and because the difference
between the jury award, and the proof of actual damages was explained by "mental
distress, humiliation, loss of reputation, and other general pain and suffering"),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 668 (1980); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir.
1979) (§ 1983 suit to vindicate fourth amendment rights violated in an un-
reasonable and destructive search; trial judge awarded $263.85 compensatory and
$200 punitive damages; court of appeals distinguished Piphus but still reversed and
remanded "the case for the award of damages for humiliation and emotional dis-
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A recent case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Birnbaum
v. United States,148 provides an excellent example of the circuitous
routes to which courts have needlessly turned to avoid presuming
damages. The plaintiffs in Birnbaum sued for the invasion of
their privacy resulting from an illegal CIA practice of opening and
reading mail to and from the Soviet Union. 49 Although each
plaintiff had had only one letter intercepted, the federal district
judge, in a pre-Piphus decision, awarded damages of $1000 to each,
holding that lack of any objective harm did not bar recovery.1 0
The judge stated clearly that "[t]he law generally recognizes that
where a person suffers an invasion of the right to privacy, awards
are appropriate for general damages covering the injury of invasion
itself, as well as for the resulting mental distress." 151
The Second Circuit, in a post-Piphus opinion, affirmed the
district court award.152 But, citing Piphus, the circuit court trans-
formed the damage issue into a question whether the plaintiffs'
testimony supported a finding of $1000 worth of "mental
anguish." '1; The circuit court's analysis tended to show that the
plaintiffs did not suffer any mental anguish, but then the court
was moved to "interpret" a finding of the trial judge "generously"
to mean that plaintiffs did in fact suffer sufficient mental anguish
to support the damage award.1 4
The point that Birnbaum and the other post-Piphus cases
demonstrate is quite clear: the broad language of the Supreme
Court in Piphus has, for inexplicable reasons, pushed lower federal
courts towards more and more convoluted and unprincipled maneu-
vers in their attempts to compensate deprivations of substantive
constitutional rights. Because Piphus is so easily distinguishable,8 5
tress"); Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1229 (D. Minn. 1979) (warrant-
less search case; court held plaintiffs entitled to nominal damages for "damage
inherent in this wrongful act" but did not discuss the possibility of presuming
substantial compensatory damages); Shuman v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp.
1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (action under Equal Credit Opportunity Act by woman
discriminatorily denied credit; court "follows" Piphus and held that damage will
not be presumed to flow from acts of invidious discrimination; plaintiff was
allowed to prove "actual damage" in the form of "embarrassment, humiliation and
mental distress").
148436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd as modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d
Cir. 1978).
149 Id. 971-72.
150 Id. 987, 990.
151 Id. 987.
152 588 F.2d at 335.
153 Id. 333.
154 Id. 333-35.
155 See text accompanying notes 108-31 supra.
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however, these decisions say more about judicial reluctance to
properly distinguish Piphus than they do about the continuing logic
of the pre-Piphus cases.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's ruling in Piphus should not be extended
to preclude awards of presumed damages in unreasonable-search-
and-seizure suits based on the fourth amendment. As the preceding
discussion of Halperin illustrates, the rationale of Piphus does not
apply to such cases, in which the constitutionally protected interest
is the substantive right to privacy. Whereas the procedural rights
involved in Piphus are, under the federal constitutional scheme,
merely a mechanical means of guarding against wrongful or mis-
taken deprivations of other constitutional rights, the right to be
free of unreasonable governmental intrusions into one's privacy is
a highly prized substantive interest.
Thus, substantial injury can be said to flow directly from, or
to inhere in, deprivations of this particular constitutional right.
Moreover, acceptance of the presumed damages concept in the
context of the common law tort of invasion of privacy supports
application of the doctrine to the analogous constitutional tort.
These distinctions may well have been contemplated by the Court
when it limited the Piphus holding to procedural due process
claims. In any case, nothing in the Piphus Court's opinion compels
lower courts to resort to fruitless speculation about the quantum
of emotional distress suffered by an individual plaintiff in order to
compensate that plaintiff for an invasion of his fourth amendment
right to privacy.
On the subject of compensation for the infringement of in-
tangible constitutional rights, Mark Yudof has written: "The fact
that the precise degree of injury may be difficult to calculate should
not lead a court to award no damages; rather it should estimate
damages, however crudely. Otherwise, the whole notion of an
entitlement to dignity becomes a farce." 156 The presumed dam-
ages doctrine offers the best tool available for performing this
estimation of the value of "dignitary" constitutional entitlements,
such as the privacy protected by the fourth amendment. Combined
with a judicial commitment to guiding and overseeing jury awards
to ensure comparability, the doctrine should make constitutional
tort suits a more consistent and rational means of vindicating
society's most important civil rights.
156 Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School
Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1322, 1378 (1976).
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